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Owen F. Humpage
Recently, the U.S. Treasury announced a new, temporary insurance program for U.S. money-market mutual funds. To 
guarantee payment of these funds’ liabilities, the Treasury will use the assets of its Exchange Stabilization Fund. Created 
in the 1930s to stabilize the exchange value of the dollar, it has been tapped on occasion to supply loans to foreign 
countries in ﬁ  nancial distress. This latest use of ESF assets is unlike anything the Fund has been used for before.
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The U.S. Treasury acted recently to preempt problems in 
another area of the ﬁ  nancial system weakened by the current 
crisis—U.S. money-market mutual funds. 
Money-market mutual funds invest in highly rated short-term 
securities, notably commercial paper, and allow investors to 
remove their funds quickly. Consequently, many investors 
have viewed the funds as essentially risk-free checking ac-
counts. But lately, some of these mutual funds are ﬁ  nding the 
value of their assets below—or perilously close to—the value 
of their liabilities, a situation more worrisome in the current 
environment because investors’ deposits are not insured. 
Runs on money-market mutual funds could have far-reaching 
effects, particularly for the commercial paper market, where 
many corporations ﬁ  nd operating funds. So in September 
2008 the Treasury announced it would create a temporary 
insurance program for money-market mutual funds. The 
mutual funds can enter this insurance program for a fee. 
The Treasury will use the near $50 billion worth of assets of 
a little-known agency within the department, the Exchange 
Stabilization Fund (ESF), to guarantee payments of money-
market-mutual-fund liabilities for up to one year. The ESF 
is a small agency whose traditional activities have consisted 
of foreign-exchange intervention and temporary stabilization 
loans to developing countries. For most people who heard the 
Treasury’s recent announcement, the fund’s obscurity was its 
most distinguishing feature, but for those who study central 
banks and monetary economics, the ESF is better known—
and rather controversial.  
Details about the new insurance program are not yet avail-
able, but a look at the origin and history of the ESF reveals 
how different such a role is from any use the ESF has been 
put to before.
ESF Origins
The Roosevelt administration and the U.S. Congress created 
the ESF in 1934, capitalizing it with $2 billion derived from 
an increase in the ofﬁ  cial price of U.S. gold. Ostensibly, Con-
gress established the ESF to stabilize the exchange value of 
the dollar by buying or selling foreign currencies and gold. At 
the time, the administration was worried that a similar British 
stabilization fund might attempt to manipulate exchange rates 
to its own advantage and wanted to throw a counter punch, 
if necessary. 
Over the years, the ESF has intervened chieﬂ  y to inﬂ  uence 
the dollar’s exchange rate against currencies of the major de-
veloped countries, primarily the German mark and Japanese 
yen. The ESF, however, also interpreted its directive—to 
stabilize the exchange rate value of the dollar—much more 
broadly, as I explain below. 
Congress allowed the ESF to be self-ﬁ  nancing and to exist 
outside of the annual appropriations process. Doing so 
guarded the agency’s secrecy, a precious commodity when 
charged with fending off currency speculators. In a like vein, 
Congress gave the secretary of the treasury full control over 
ESF operations. Responding quickly is also essential for suc-
cessful foreign-exchange operations. Aside from the presi-
dent, no other ofﬁ  cer of the U.S. government has authority 
to review the Treasury’s decisions regarding ESF operations. 
Since the late 1970s, Congress has imposed some oversight 
on operations and on the ﬁ  nancing of the ESF, but these are 
largely after-the-fact reporting requirements. Fund opera-
tions remain squarely within purview of the Treasury. 
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The Gold Reserve Act authorizes the ESF to stabilize 
dollar exchange rates. As Anna Schwartz details in her 
history of the ESF, the Fund’s early foreign exchange opera-
tions were fairly limited. It truly became active in 1961 when 
it attempted to shore up the Bretton Woods system. The 
United States and other large industrial countries had ﬁ  xed 
their exchange rates under the Bretton Woods Agreement 
Act in 1945, but the system did not become fully functional 
until the end of 1958. Shortly thereafter, the dollar faced fairly 
persistent downward pressures. The ESF acted in both the 
spot and forward exchange markets to stabilize the dollar, but 
the Fund quickly found its resources insufﬁ  cient for the task. 
To alleviate the shortfall, the Federal Reserve System began to 
intervene along with the ESF in 1962. The Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, which had always intervened as the agent 
of the ESF, now acted on behalf of both the ESF’s account 
and the Fed’s own account. 
While the Federal Reserve and the ESF have separate legal 
authority to intervene, most observers recognize the Treasury 
as having primary responsibility for these operations. The 
Treasury probably cannot compel the Fed to intervene, but 
the Fed has only rarely refused. Appearing not to cooperate 
in a legitimate policy operation of the administration would 
raise market uncertainty about the operation and could sabo-
tage its chances for success. 
The Federal Reserve’s decision to intervene on its own ac-
count raised some eyebrows in 1962, and it has occasionally 
done so ever since. For one thing, U.S. foreign-exchange 
operations, as routinely conducted, do not alter fundamental 
macroeconomic determinants of exchange rates, like U.S. 
bank reserves. Consequently, intervention cannot systemati-
cally inﬂ  uence exchange rates. At best, intervention seems to 
sometimes affect the market’s perception of these fundamen-
tals. This small, uncertain gain, however, may come at a cost. 
Many wonder if it is appropriate for an independent central 
bank to act in concert with a government’s ﬁ  scal authority in 
an action that may seem at odds with the goals of monetary 
policy. Often, during the 1980s and early 1990s, the dollar 
appreciated as the FOMC tightened monetary policy. The 
Treasury and the Fed then intervened to offset the dollar’s 
appreciation by buying foreign exchange. While the opera-
tions did not directly interfere with monetary policy, many 
FOMC members felt that they created confusion in the mar-
kets about the Fed’s near-term policy objectives and reduced 
the long-term credibility of monetary policy. 
One speciﬁ  c aspect of this relationship, called warehousing, 
became a particular ﬂ  ashpoint. To understand the controver-
sy, one needs ﬁ  rst to understand what the ESF does besides 
directly intervening in the foreign-exchange market. 
Stabilization Loans
In addition to foreign-exchange intervention, the ESF has 
provided temporary stabilization loans to select developing 
countries. Most of these have been Latin American coun-
tries, with Mexico being the most persistent recipient. 
While these operations conform broadly to the ESF’s direc-
tive of stabilizing dollar exchange rates—many of these coun-
tries pegged their currencies to the dollar—the recipients 
need not use these funds directly in their exchange markets. 
Some, for example, have dressed up their foreign exchange 
reserves on reporting dates. Consequently, the loans often 
have a distinct foreign-aid and foreign-policy ﬂ  avor. In the 
summers of 1988 and 1990, for example, the ESF made 
temporary stabilization loans to Yugoslavia and to Hungary, 
respectively, whose currencies were of little economic im-
portance to the United States, but the loans fostered foreign-
policy objectives. 
The ESF usually extends these stabilization loans by setting 
up a swap line. Swap lines are temporary facilities through 
which the ESF can “swap” U.S. dollars for the currency of 
a foreign country. Essentially, they are short-term loans in 
which the borrowing country’s currency acts as collateral. 
Occasionally, as in the Mexican peso crisis of 1995, other 
collateral is required. The borrowing country gets to use the 
U.S. funds, and the lender automatically invests the foreign 









1.  Currency Denominations of ESF Assets
Notes: ESF assets are total assets and SDRs less SDR certiﬁ  cates, 
valued in billions of dollars, following Osterberg and Thomson (1999). 
SDRs are special drawing rights, an international reserve currency 
created by the International Monetary Fund.
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The ESF’s ability to acquire foreign exchange either through 
interventions or by extending swap loans to developing 
countries is limited by the amount of dollar-denominated 
assets in its portfolio. In August 2008, the ESF had nearly 
$50 billion in assets and $40 billion in capital (assets less 
liabilities). As ﬁ  gure 1 indicates, fewer than $17 billion of 
these assets are denominated in dollars. 
The ESF currently holds $9.5 billion worth of Special Draw-
ing Rights (SDRs). SDRs were created by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1969 to serve as an international 
reserve asset. At the time, the world needed a reserve asset 
besides gold, the dollar, or some other national currency to 
sustain the Bretton Woods system, but by the time the IMF 
created the SDR, Bretton Woods was beyond repair. It col-
lapsed in August 1971. Nevertheless, the SDR still exists as 
an international reserve asset. 
The ESF can monetize—change into dollars—its SDRs. With 
the authorization of the treasury secretary, the ESF creates 
a “swap certiﬁ  cate,” a liability on its balance sheet, and sells 
it to the Federal Reserve for dollars. The Federal Reserve is 
legally obliged to accept SDR certiﬁ  cates. 
The ESF can also obtain dollars by warehousing foreign ex-
change with the Federal Reserve. Warehousing is a currency 
swap in which the Federal Reserve buys foreign currency 
from the ESF in a spot transaction and sells it back to the 
ESF in a forward transaction. The duration typically has 
been 12 months, but some unwound early and some rolled 
over. Because the Federal Reserve undertakes the spot and 
forward portions of these swaps at the same exchange rate, 
unanticipated exchange-rate movements have no ﬁ  nancial 
consequences for the Fed. The Fed earns interest from any 
foreign-currency denominated assets that it holds as a conse-
quence of the swap, but loses interest on the Treasury securi-
ties that it might have to sell to offset any monetary impacts 
from the ESF’s dollar sales. 
Many FOMC participants have viewed warehousing as a 
temporary loan from the Federal Reserve to the ESF, col-
lateralized with foreign exchange. The Federal Reserve Act 
does not include such lending authority, and the Banking 
Act of 1935 prohibits the Federal Reserve from purchas-
ing U.S. government obligations, except in the open (or 
secondary) market. The U.S. Congress granted the Federal 
Reserve authority to lend up to $5 billion to the Treasury 
for short durations in 1942, but this authority expired in 
1981. Opponents of warehousing argue that in the absence 
of clear ongoing lending authority, the Fed should not ware-
house currencies for the ESF, especially given the foreign-
policy nature of many ESF stabilization loans. 
Proponents view warehousing as a temporary exchange of 
assets—not as a loan. Moreover, because the Treasury does 
not issue German marks or Japanese yen—as it does U.S. 
government securities—the Treasury constitutes part of the 
open market for foreign exchange. They sometimes point to 
parallels between warehousing and the acceptance of SDR 
certiﬁ  cates. Hence, proponents contend warehousing foreign 
exchange is wholly acceptable. 
The FOMC currently authorizes the Fed to warehouse up to 
$5 billion in foreign exchange for the ESF. During the Mexi-
can peso crisis of 1995, the limit was increased to $20 billion. 
However, no funds have been warehoused since 1992. 
No matter how one characterizes warehousing operations—
as a loan or an asset exchange—opponents worry that it al-
lows the Treasury to skirt the Congressional appropriations 
process. Of the original $2 billion appropriated by Congress 
to the ESF, all but $200 million was later used to pay the 
United States’ subscription to the IMF. The ESF retains 
interest and capital gains on the domestic and foreign assets 
that it holds, but if it needs more funds for intervention or 
for lending, opponents of warehousing contend that the 
ESF should seek a Congressional appropriation. 
New Avenues, Old Problems
The Treasury’s surprising decision to offer insurance to 
money-market mutual funds through the ESF is clearly a 
broad extension of the Fund’s traditional role, but one that 
Treasury could undertake quickly and easily in anxious 
times. The existence of this insurance—like insurance for 
bank deposits—should stem fears and prevent a run on 
money-market mutual funds. The ESF has nearly $17 bil-
lion in dollar-denominated assets readily available to back-
stop money-market mutual funds. Beyond that, the ESF 
would need to convert foreign-currency denominated assets 
into dollars, either by selling them to the market or foreign 
central banks or by exchanging them for dollars with the 
Federal Reserve System. The latter prospect risks awakening 
some long-dormant controversies. 
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